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Public schools in Chile receive a per-student subsidy depending on enrollment, and are 
managed by local governments that operate under soft budget constraints. In this paper, 
we study the effects of this system on per-student expenditures. Per-student expenditures 
on rural areas are 30% higher than in urban areas. We find that about 75% of this 
difference is due to the fact that rural public schools are significantly smaller and thus do 
not benefit from economies of scale. Besides, we also show that in our preferred 
estimates about 50% of the students in rural areas could be moved to schools that could 
exploit economies of scale – i.e., these students could attend bigger schools traveling at 
most an hour day a day in total. We show that even if we use conservative average speed 
rates or control for transportation, utility and infrastructure costs, there is a sizeable share 
of students that could be consolidated. We argue that local governments that have soft 
budget constraints do not consolidate these schools giving the existing potential because 
of political factors: closing schools is harmful for mayors in electoral terms. Consistent 
with this claim, we find that a decrease in the degree of political competition in areas 
with better access to non-voucher transfers from the central government (i.e. with softer 
budget constraints) decreases the extent of the inefficiency. 
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Abstract 
Public schools in Chile receive a per-student subsidy depending on enrollment, and are 
managed by local governments that operate under soft budget constraints. In this paper, 
we  study  the  effects  of  this  system  on  per-student  expenditures.  Per-student 
expenditures on rural areas are 30% higher than in urban areas. We find that about 75% 
of this difference is due to the fact that rural public schools are significantly smaller and 
thus do not benefit from economies of scale. Besides, we also show that in our preferred 
estimates about 50% of the students in rural areas could be moved to schools that could 
exploit economies of scale—i.e., these students could attend bigger schools traveling at 
most an hour a day in total. We show that even if we use conservative average speed 
rates or control for transportation, utility and infrastructure costs, there is a sizeable 
share of the students that could be consolidated. We argue that local governments that 
have  soft  budget  constraints  do  not  consolidate  these  schools  giving  the  existing 
potential because of political factors: closing schools is harmful for mayors in electoral 
terms. Consistent with this claim, we find that a decrease in the degree of political 
competition  in  areas  with  better  access  to n o n - v o u c h e r  t r a n s f e r s  f r o m  t h e  c e n t r a l  
government (i.e. with softer budget constraints) decreases the extent of the inefficiency. 
Keywords: School size, rural schools, consolidation, Chile, education decentralization, 
political economy, soft budget constraints.  
JEL codes: I22, H52, H75. 
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1. Introduction 
Providing education in rural areas in an effective and efficient way is a policy priority in 
the developing world. Some authors suggest that decentralization of school management 
could improve the quality and quantity of education (Oates, 1972; Inman and Rubinfeld, 
1997; Fuchs and Woessman, 2004; Woessman, 2003; Gallego, 2009). Others argue that 
decentralization can create inefficient or unequal provision of education (See Haggard, 
1999 and Bardhan, 2002 for reviews, Kremer et al., 2002 and Galiani et al., 2009 for 
empirical  evidence,  and  Gennaioli  and  Rainer,  2004  for  a  theoretical  model).  For 
instance, decentralization in the absence of local checks and balances could allow elites 
to capture the local government and block the provision of public goods, or to distribute 
expenditures towards their members.  
In this paper, we investigate whether expenditure in rural areas is efficient or not in the 
Chilean decentralized system. In order to tackle this problem we first study the cost 
structure  of  the  provision  of  education  in  rural  areas.  We  show  that  there  exist 
significant economies of scale. Moreover, we show that there are potential net benefits 
associated with school consolidation, i.e., economies of scale more than compensate 
required  additional  infrastructure  and  greater  travel  distances.  Then,  we  posit  an 
institutional explanation for such suboptimal choice of school size. Mayors, we argue, 
face electoral costs if they decide to close and merge schools and soft budget constrains 
allow them to run deficits associated with the suboptimal size structure. Our empirical 
finding that lack of political competition together with a closer relationship between the 
local and central government (our proxy for the softness of local government budget 
constraints) decreases the extent of the inefficiency is in line with such explanation. 
Thereby,  we  learn  that  in  order  to  capture  the  benefits  from  decentralized  school 
management, we require an institutional setting that prevents conflicts of interest for 
local political officers. 
Te  institutional  setting  in  which  public  schools  in  Chile  operate  is  central  for  our 
findings. Public schools in Chile receive a per-student subsidy depending on enrollment, 
and  are  managed  by  local  governments.  These  local  governments  tend  to  face  soft 
budget constraints because most of them operate under education deficits that can be 
financed with non-voucher transfers from the central government (Serrano and Berner,  3
2002; Gallego, 2006). In addition, in rural areas, there is usually just a few schools in 
each market, and hence parents face fewer options than in urban areas.
1 
The scale of operation has serious consequences for the level and differences between 
urban and rural schools in terms of educational expenditures.
2 Thus, the low number of 
students  in  rural  areas  may  result  in  higher  per-student  expenditures.  Because  per-
student subsidies do not (for the most part) depend on the size of the school, the higher 
per-student  expenditures  translate  into  a  financial  deficit  that  affects  rural  school 
operators.
3  In  this  paper,  we  use  an  IV  approach  that  exploits  the  split  of  big 
municipalities into small ones and population shocks to explore the potential existence 
of economies of scale. We study these economies of scale in two dimensions: at the 
municipal administration level
4 and at the school level. We find that while there exist 
important economies of scale at the school level, economies of scale at the municipal 
administration level are neither statistically nor economically relevant. Our estimates 
suggest that about 75% of the differences between per-student expenditures in rural and 
urban areas are due to rural schools being smaller.  
Next, we show that there is significant potential room for consolidation of small rural 
schools into bigger schools. Using geographical information for a sample of schools, we 
find that, in our preferred estimate, about one half of the enrollment in rural schools 
may be subject to a process of consolidation in which students would go to bigger 
schools without traveling more than one hour a day to their new schools (which is 
comparable to what students in urban areas travel to school). Alternative estimates using 
more optimistic and conservative assumptions imply that 54% and 34% of the students 
could be consolidated into bigger schools.  

1 This phenomenon seems to be largely explained by the existence of economies of scale in the provision 
of schooling (see evidence for the US in Andrews et al., 2002 and for Chile in Tironi, 2004). Tironi 
(2004)  argues  that  at  least  650  pupils  are  needed  for  a  subsidized  private  school  to  provide  quality 
education  in  a  disadvantaged  municipality.  Since  the  average  number  of  students  in  Chilean 
municipalities without voucher schools is 886 pupils, there should be no space for more than one good 
school in that municipality operating without losses. 
2 In previous research we show that the differences in educational outcomes between rural and urban 
schools in Chile are mostly due to differences in the socioeconomic characteristics of the students, with 
the size of operation of the schools or school districts having only second order effects on quality (see 
Gallego et al. 2007).  
3 In Chile, there exists a subsidy that guarantees the supply of resources to the schools for at least the 
equivalent of 35 pupils. However, these resources are not sufficient to finance the average student cost. 
4 I n  C h i l e  s c h o o l  d i s t r i c t s  e x a c t l y  c o r r e s p o n d  t o  the  area  of  local  governments  and  therefore  local 
governments manage all public schools in each municipality.  4
We also show that the benefits of school consolidation in terms of cost savings more 
than  compensate  the  additional  infrastructure,  transportation,  and  opportunity  costs 
associated to the expansion of current schools into bigger schools and to the additional 
distance from school to the students’ homes. In other words, we find a big inefficiency 
in the size of schools managed by local governments.  
We then hypothesize that this inefficiency may be due to the existence of incentive 
problems  for  mayors:  closing  schools  in  municipalities  may  be  harmful  for  their 
electoral  prospects.  So  they r u n  d e f i c i t s  t h a t ,  g i v e n  t h e  existence  of  soft  budget 
constraints, are financed at least partially with non-voucher transfers. Consistent with 
this claim and previous evidence (Gallego, 2006), we show that a decrease in the degree 
of political competition in a municipality with better access to non-voucher transfers 
from the central government decreases the extent of inefficiency in the allocation of 
students. This is consistent with our claim that consolidation has political non-trivial 
costs. 
The results in this paper are interesting for different literatures. First, our results imply 
that  decentralization  of  school  management  towards  local  governments  under  soft 
budget  constraints  could  be  inefficient.  Local  governments  do  not  necessarily  have 
incentives to minimize costs because in doing so they may face relevant electoral costs 
and, therefore, they exploit the softness of the budget constraint to incur in higher costs 
that  are  paid  by  non-voucher  transfers.  Thus,  this  paper  comes  to  complement  the 
literature  on  the  effects  of  decentralization,  which  typically  focus  on  education 
outcomes (eg., Fuchs and Woessman, 2004; Woessman, 2003; Gallego, 2009; Kremer 
et  al.,  2002  and  Galiani  et  al.,  2009)  by  providing  evidence  on  the  impact  of 
decentralization on expenditures.  
Second,  and  related  to  the  previous  point,  our  paper  also c o n t r i b u t e s  t o  t h e  s m a l l  
literature on the political economy aspects of school and school district consolidation. 
(eg., Gustely, 1977). Our results imply that when political officials, as mayors, are in 
charge of education they do not only care about educational outcomes, but also about 
other objectives. Thus, they face a conflict of interest: they face non-trivial costs of 
closing and merging schools and probably need to compensate voters to do so. We 
present evidence that school consolidation in Chile is affected by political aspects. 
Third, our results are related to the literature on school and school district consolidation 
in the US. Our results on the absence of cost savings at the municipal level may seem 
inconsistent with previous papers for the US that tend to find significant economies of  5
scale at the school district level (Andrews et al., 2002). However, the opposite is true. 
Most of the studies for the US find that the economies of scale are relevant just for very 
small districts. For instance, Andrews et al. (2002) find that there seem to exist potential 
savings in instructional and administrative costs from moving very small districts with 
less  than  around  500  students  into  districts  with  around  2000-4000  students.  Cost 
savings for bigger districts are less important. But in Chile just less that 20% of the 
municipalities have enrollment of less than 500 students, with the average municipality 
having  an  enrollment  of  about  2,500  students  (and  with  most  of  the  municipalities 
operating with enrollments in the interval between 600 and 3000 students). Thus, our 
evidence could be interpreted as consistent with the previous evidence for US given that 
the size of the school districts are around the cost minimizing levels. Moreover, we 
complement this literature by presenting instrumental-variable estimates (based on the 
splitting  of  municipalities  and  exogenous  population  shocks)  of  the  determinants  of 
costs. This use of instrumental variable help solves identification typically presents in 
studies for the US (as emphasized by Andrews et al., 2002). 
Results on economies of scale at the school level are also consistent with evidence for 
the US (Deller and Rudnicki, 1993). Average (median) primary school enrollment in 
Chilean public schools is around 200 (70) students. More strikingly, average (median) 
primary school enrollment in Chilean rural public schools is around 75 (20) students. 
Deller and Rudnicki (1992) find that the cost minimizing school enrollment level is 
around 2,000 students. Thus, our result of a significant room to exploit economies of 
scale are not surprising because currently public schools in Chile are really small and far 
below cost minimizing levels.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a brief description of 
rural education in Chile. Section 3 analyzes the determinants of school expenditures. 
Section 4 analyzes whether the small size of the schools could be due to prohibitive 
transportation or infrastructure costs. Section 5 studies the hypothesis that the size of the 
inefficiency in the number of schools is related to the interaction of political factors and 
the existence of soft-budget constraints and section 6 briefly concludes. 
 
2. Rural education in Chile 
Net enrollment in primary education in Chile is 97.8% in rural areas and over 99% in 
urban areas (CASEN, 2003). In terms of results of the educational process, Figure 1 
shows  average  scores  obtained  by  fourth-graders  in  the  SIMCE  mathematics  test  6
applied in the year 2005, per household income group.
5 The results show that, within all 
socio-economic groups, rural students perform significantly worse than urban students.
6 
Regarding educational supply, Figure 2 presents an indicator of the relative number of 
voucher schools, which corresponds to the ratio between the number of voucher and 
municipal schools in the year 2005. This figure indicates that differences of educational 
supply strongly increase as the socio-economic level of the household increases. There 
are two interesting observations related to this figure: (i) for students in rural areas, the 
supply of voucher schools increases only slowly as the socio-economic level increases, 
and (ii) the pupils of a low socio-economic status from urban areas and rural areas face 
a  very  similar  supply  of  voucher  schools.  The  later  point  is  confirmed  by  some 
indicators of the reasons why parents chose among different schools (Figure 3)–taken 
from data from surveys to parents of the 2005 SIMCE test. 
Figure 3 shows that roughly 60% of the parents who send their children to municipal 
schools in rural areas do so because the establishment is close to where they live. In 
contrast, only 40% of the parents sending their children to municipal schools in urban 
areas choose schools based on location. This difference is similar in the case of parents 
who send their children to voucher schools: a little more than 30% of parents in rural 
areas choose school on the basis of location, whereas only 20% do so in urban areas.  
Table 1 summarizes school characteristics by size, type of school, and area for 2005. 
From  this  table,  we  observe  that  rural schools  have  an  average  of  80  pupils  and  5 
teachers, whereas urban schools have 470 pupils and 21 teachers on average. There are 
some differences per type of school, with voucher schools being somewhat larger than 
municipal schools (92 versus 76 pupils, but with the same number of teachers).
7  
Figures 4 to 6 put this information in a dynamic perspective for schools located in rural 
areas. In terms of enrollment, we observe a significant drop in the number of pupils 
attending schools in these areas. Total enrollment dropped by close to 16% in the period 

5 SIMCE is the acronym for Sistema de Medición de la Calidad de la Educación (National System for the 




th grade and evaluates language, mathematics and (natural and social) science. 
We use the math test because, in general, as it is the best predictor of human capital; see for example 
Hanushek and Kimko (2000) and Barro (2001). In terms of socio-economic level, Gallego et al. (2007) 
shows a decomposition of these results considering mother education. 
6 In this paper we do not study the impact of rural education on test scores. Gallego et al. (2007) find that 
most of the differences between urban and rural students are related to socioeconomic status.  
7 N o t i c e  t h a t  t h i s  i s  n o t  i n c o n s i s t e n t  w i t h  o u r  d i s c u s s i o n  i n  f o o t n o t e  1 .  T i r o n i  ( 2 0 0 4 )  d e f i n e s  t h e  
enrollment level for schools to have “good” academic outcomes. Most rural schools in Chile have poor 
performance in most academic indicators.   7
1992-2006 (equivalent to an annual drop of 1.2%). This drop in enrollment was related 
to a fall in school-age population close to 0.9% during that period. 
Note that the drop in enrollment is only relevant for attendance at municipal schools, 
while voucher schools have maintained a virtually constant enrollment. Figure 5 shows 
that, at the same time, the number of municipal schools has fallen at a slower rate than 
the drop in enrollment. This explains the patterns observed in Figure 6, with a drop of 
close to 12% in average enrollment of municipal schools (from 70 pupils in 1992 to 62 
in  the  year  2006).  In  contrast,  voucher  schools  have  maintained  a  constant  average 
enrollment over the same period. 
Finally, using data of the SINIM data base,
8 it is possible to carry out estimations of the 
average per-student expenditure in the municipal sector, for a sample of 345 Chilean 
municipalities in 2005. Rural municipalities
9 have per-student expenditures 30% higher 
that those of urban areas (about US$ 1,230 versus US$ 960 per year in average, where 
personnel expenses of the schools represent a little over 80% of total expenses). 
 
All in all, rural education in Chile presents a high enrollment rate (although lower than 
in urban areas), lower quality than in urban areas, a lower supply of schools than in 
urban areas, and schools of smaller size. From a dynamic perspective, enrollment has 
fallen,  and  this  fall  has  concentrated  in  municipal  schools.  The  fall  in  enrollment, 
together  with  the  inertia  in  the  number  of  municipal  schools,  has  translated  into  a 
significant drop in the average size of the schools. Consequently, in a context of strong 
economies of scale at the school level, per-student expenditures are increasingly higher 
in rural areas. 
 
3. Public school expenditures and rurality 
In  this  section  we  study  the  determinants  of  per-student  expenditures  in  municipal 
schools.
10 As mentioned before, rural schools incur in higher expenses per pupil than 
urban schools. One of the competing hypotheses is that economies of scale put small 
schools, such as the rural ones, at a disadvantage. There could also be economies of 

8 SINIM is the acronym for Sistema Nacional de Indicadores Munipales (National System of Municipal 
Indicators), which presents detailed information for all the Chilean municipalities. 
9 Rural municipalities are those that have less than 25% of their population living in urban areas.  
10 In this paper we study education expenditures, in contrast to education costs, given the fact that the 
analysis  carried  out  does  not  consider  any  type  of  private  or  social  cost  of  education  other  than 
expenditures actually incurred by the municipalities.  8
scale  relative  to  the  size  of t h e  m u n i c i p a l  s c h o o l  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n .  A s  t h e  l i t e r a t u r e  
emphaises (eg. Andrews et al., 2002) both kinds of economies are completely different. 
This section studies this issue in detail. 
We start by noticing that the existence of economies of scale does not imply that the 
school administrators will actually use them. It is worth asking whether the agents who 
operate municipal schools have the incentives to exploit these economies or not. It is not 
clear  that  municipal  administrations  have  expenditure  minimization  as  an  objective, 
especially in a regime of soft budget constraints, as identified in Chile by several studies 
(Serrano and Berner, 2002; Sapelli, 2003; Gallego, 2006; and Gallego and Seebach, 
2007). Therefore, our estimations do not recover the best existing technology, just the 
actual response of expenditures to certain determining factors in the current institutional 
context. 
We shall divide the analysis in three parts. In the first part we study the relationship 
between total student expenditures and total enrollment at the municipality level. Next, 
we analyze the relation between per-student expenditures and the number of municipal 
schools in a municipality. Finally, we study the relationship between expenditure and 
the average size of the municipal schools in the municipality
11. 
We assume the following functional form for expenditures:  
 t k kt kt kt kt N E K K H D
E      ' exp x ,              (1) 
where k refers to municipality and t to year, E is an expenditure measure, N is the total 
number of students (schools), x is a vector of controls including a rurality index, poverty 
rates (in level and logs), Kc is a municipality fixed effect, K t is a time fixed effect, H is a 
random shock, and D and E are parameters to be estimated. Our estimating equation 
corresponds  to  logarithm  transformations  of  (1).  Notice  that  the  inclusion  of 
municipality fixed effects implies we control for between municipality heterogeneity –
ie., any factor that is time-invariant at the municipality level—and, consequently, the 
estimators identify within municipality effects. 
Economies of scale imply that E<1. In contrast, diseconomies of scale imply that E>1. 
Thus, we test whether E=1 or not to identify the existence of economies of scale in 
education expenditures. 

11 I n  a l l  e s t i m a t i o n s  w e  u s e  d a t a  f r o m  t h e  S I N I M  f o r  t h e  y e a r s  1 9 9 9  t o  2 0 0 5  f o r  c l o s e  t o  3 0 0  
municipalities.   9
Before  proceeding  to  the  estimates,  a  point h a s  t o  b e  m a d e  r e g a r d i n g  p o t e n t i a l  
identification problems. Our focus is on studying the causal effect of school enrollment 
on per-student expenditures. For starters, it is worth emphasizing that the longitudinal 
nature  of  the  data  set  allows  us  to  control  for  time-invariant  municipality  effects. 
However,  it  is  also  possible  that  expenditures  affect  enrollment  in  a  time  variant 
manner,  for  instance,  via  migration  of  students  between  municipalities.  It  is  also 
possible that there is measurement error in the enrollment variable, which may attenuate 
the enrollment coefficients, or the existence of time-varying omitted variables affecting 
both  variables.  To  avoid  these  problems,  our  preferred  estimates  use  instrumental 
variable methods.  
Our identification strategy relies on two sources of exogenous variation: (i) a dummy 
that takes the value of 1 if the municipality loses territory, this refers to municipalities 
that were divided and, therefore, part of their population and schools comes to depend to 
other municipalities and (ii) a dummy that takes a value of 1 if the population of the 
municipality drops by 3% or more in one year (this instrumental variable is similar in 
spirit to the ones used by Kuziemko, 2006). In both cases the identification assumption 
is that both variables have no direct effect on the educational expense beyond their 
effect on enrollment.
12 
Column (1) of Table 2 presents the results of the first stage for total enrollment using 
only  the  dummy  for  split  areas.  This  IV  presents  the  expected  sign  and  is  highly 
significant (F-test of 47.4, well above the Stock and Yogo (2005) weak identification 
test critical values). Estimates imply that municipalities that were split decrease their 
enrollment in about 45 log points. In column (2), we include the dummy for a big drop 
in population and find that both IVs present the expected signs, but only the dummy for 
split municipalities is statistically significant and decrease in absolute value in about 7 
log points. Still, the two IV are jointly significant with an F test of about 24.  
In turn, in columns (3) and (4) we study the first stage for the number of schools in an 
area. In this case, both IVs are statistically significant and economically relevant. We 
discuss column (5) below. 

12 The new municipalities are Alto Hospicio created from Iquique in 2005, Alto Bio Bío created from 
Santa Bárbara in 2005, Hualpén created from Talcahuano in 2005, and Cholchol created from Nueva 
Imperial in 2004. As a validation check of our identification strategy it is important to notice that these 
communities  are  not  different  from  other  municipalities  in  terms  of  (using  values  before  the  actual 
splitting of the municipality): number of students in public schools, number of public schools, poverty 
rates, and urbanization rates. Results are available upon request.   10
Table  3  presents  estimates  of  the  effect  of  student  enrollment  on  educational 
expenditures at the municipality level. Following the literature (eg., Andrews et al., 
2002) we present estimates for three categories of expenditure: central administration of 
schools,  schools  payroll,  and  operational  expenditure.  We  also  present  estimates 
including (Panel A) and excluding outliers (Panel B).
13  
We  start  presenting  OLS  results,  as  a  benchmark  that  are  probably  highly  biased. 
Results imply a positive and statistically significant correlation between the number of 
students and total expenditure, as expected. The estimated coefficient is in all the cases 
significantly different from 1 and suggesting strong economies of scale.  
The results of the next three columns of both panels of Table 3 present IV estimates 
using  only  one  IV  –dummies  for  split  municipalities.  Estimated  coefficients  of 
enrollment are, in general, very close to one and, from an statistical point of view, the 
null hypothesis of equality to 1 cannot be rejected (with p-values above 0.60). The 
strong difference between IV and OLS estimates imply that probably there is either a lot 
of measurement error in the enrollment dataset that attenuates OLS estimates or that 
there  is  some  omitted  variable  that  is  positively  correlated  with  enrollment  and 
negatively correlated with Hkt. IV regressions solve this problem and isolates the causal 
effect of enrollment.  
Finally, the last three columns of both panels in Table 3 present IV results using both 
instrumental variables. The using of two variables allows us to use more information 
and also apply an over-identification test. Estimated coefficient for enrollment are also 
very close to 1 (in this case with p-values above 0.45) and in all the cases the over-
identification tests suggest the null hypothesis is supported by the data, thus giving 
some support for our identification strategy.  
Therefore,  IV  estimates  imply  that  per-student  expenditures  do  not  depend  on  the 
number of students in the public schools of the municipality. As previously discussed, 
this may be a consequence of the fact that most municipalities in Chile operate with 
moderate sizes of enrollment. 
Regarding the effect of the other variables, results in Table 3 imply that there is no 
significant correlation between expenditures and poverty (documented also in Gallego 
and Seebach, 2007). Moreover, the effect of rurality is significant only for operational 
expenditures, as we explain below. 

13 The municipalities are considered outliers if there is an increase or decrease in the expenditures of at 
least 50% in absolute value regarding the previous (next) period.  11
Now, we proceed to studying the relationship between per-student expenditures and the 
number of municipal schools in operation in the municipality, given that we already 
showed  that  there  are  constant  returns  to s c a l e .  T h e  e m p i r i c a l  specification  and 
identification strategies are similar to those used in the previous case. In Table 4, we 
start  presenting  in  the  first  three  columns,  as  in  the  previous  case,  OLS  estimates. 
Results suggest that there is a significant correlation between number of schools and 
expenditure  per  student  only  in  the  case  of  central  administration  expenditures 
(remember that this is the category with the lowest share in total expenditure, with a 
share  of  about  7%  in  total  expenditure  in a v e r a g e ) ,  .  I n  t h e  o t h e r  t w o  c a s e s ,  t h e  
correlation is not different from zero.  
In the remaining columns we present IV estimates (columns 3 and 4 of Table 2 present 
the first stage results). In this case, there is no significant effect of the number of schools 
on the per-student expenditures. Again, we do not observe an effect of poverty and, in 
this  case,  there  is  a  positive  effect  of  the  rural  variable  on  the  three  expenditure 
categories.  Again,  the  over-identification  tests  suggest  our  identification  strategy  is 
consistent with the data. 
As a whole, results of Tables 3 and 4 imply that there seems to be no causal effect of the 
scale  of  operation  of  the  municipal  education  sector  on  per-student  expenditures  of 
municipal schools. .One policy implication of these results is that, under the current 
institutional  circumstances  and  levels  of  enrollment  at  the  municipal  level,  the 
consolidation  of  the  administration  of  public  schools  into  groups  of  schools  from 
different  municipalities  should  not  be  expected  to  have  a  significant  effect  on  the 
expenses per pupil and, therefore, on the total expenses.
14 
In the rest of this section, we study the potential effect of the economies of scale at the 
school level. In doing this, we include the average school enrollment in a municipality 
as a proxy of the scale of its schools. In this case, we use the ratio of enrollment lagged 
one period as an instrument for the contemporary number of schools in order to avoid a 

14 There may have other (positive or negative) effects on other dimensions that we go beyond the scope of 
this  paper.  For  instance,  Contreras  et  al.  (2007)  find  that  small  networks  –with  between  3  and  5 
members—of privately subsidized schools in Chile do better than stand-alone and public schools. This 
contrasts with results in Gallego et al. (2007), where we find that there is no significant correlation 
between  the  number  of  public s c h o o l s  i n  a  m u n i c i p a l i t y  a n d  t e s t s  s c o r e s .  T h e s e  r e s u l t s  a r e  n o t  
incompatible with the results in Contreras et al. (2007) because the average (median) number of schools 
by municipality is about 18 (15) and, therefore, networks of public schools are probably operating at a 
level in which there are no effects of the size of the network.  12
potential division bias (ie. a non-classical form of error in variables, see Borjas, 1980). 
Column (5) of Table 2 presents the first stage results and Table 5 present the OLS and 
IV estimates using a panel data set with municipality and year fixed effects. As in 
previous analyses, we consider the same three expenditure categories and we present 
estimates including and excluding outliers. 
OLS results are significantly lower than IV estimates probably reflecting the presence of 
mechanical division bias in the estimation. IV results in Table 5 imply that an increase 
in the average size of the schools in a municipality:  
  significantly increases the per-student expenditures in administrative staff. This 
effect  may  reflect  the  fact  that  more  and/or  better  staff  are  needed  at  the 
municipality level to administrate schools that in average are bigger. 
  reduces the per-student expenditures in staff related to schools. This probably 
captures the basic effect of the economies of scale at the school level in which 
there  is  a  fixed  level  of  staff  needed  –a  principal,  some  inspectors  and 
administrative and managerial staff, and even a teacher by each classroom in 
operation—to have the school running . 
  reduces the operational per-student expenditures insofar as the average size of 
schools increases (although this result is not statistically significant).
15 
These  results  are  mostly  consistent  with  previous  results  in  the  literature  and  also 
validate  the  idea  of  presenting  estimates  for  different  expenditure  categories.  As 
previously  discussed,  it  is w o r t h  n o t i n g  t h a t  m o s t  o f  the  municipal  expenditure  in 
schools  is  related  to  the  payroll  and  operational  expenditure  and,  therefore,  when 
considering total expenditures there is a significant and economically relevant negative 
impact of average school size on total per-student expenditures. 
In  relation  to  the  effect  of o t h e r  v a r i a b l e s  o n  e x p e n s es  per  student,  poverty  again 
appears not to have a significant effect. Rural areas tend to have higher expenditures, 
even when controlling for average size of schools. Giving that expenditures in teacher 
wages dominate total per-student expenditures, rural municipalities spend, on average, 
25% more per student. In other words, three fourths of the differences of expenses per 

15 Note that the elimination of outliers increases the precision of the estimators without changing the point 
estimates, validating the idea that these observations just reflect noise in the dependent variable due to 
measurement error.  13
pupil in municipal education between rural and urban areas originate from the fact that 
rural areas have smaller schools.
16 
 
In sum, the results of this section suggest that, under the current institutional context, (i) 
the size of the municipal administration (measured both by the number of students and 
the number of schools) has no significant effect on per-student expenditures and (ii) the 
average  size  of  the  municipal  schools  does  have  a  significant  effect  on  these 
expenditures.
17 In the next section, using the expenditure estimates from this section, we 
study whether rural municipalities could take advantage of economies of scale more 
efficiently than what they currently do. 
 
4. Why not school consolidation? The role of economic costs 
Based on the results obtained in the previous section, we study whether there is room 
for  school  consolidation  in r u r a l  a r e a s  a n d  w e  p r e s ent  evidence  on  why  local 
governments may be failing to do so. In Chile, we observe rural public schools are 
usually very small, as reported in Table 1, and, moreover, are becoming smaller due to a 
decrease  in  enrollment  in  rural  areas  without  changing  the  number  of  schools.  One 
potential explanation is that, for reasons of efficiency, the consolidation of schools is 
currently impossible; for example because the schools are located in remote places and, 
therefore, transportation costs may make prohibitive to consolidate schools. To evaluate 
this possibility, we carried out a simulation exercise where we estimate the percentage 
of existing schools that might merge with other schools, subject to the constraint that the 

16 N o t e  t h a t  t h e s e  r e s u l t s  t h a t  r u r a l  a r e a s  h a v e  higher  expenditures  do  not  necessarily  imply  that 
differential subsidies are justified in favor of the rural areas. For example, it may be that the differences 
detrimental to rural areas are due to the inefficiencies thereof. 
17 We do not study the potential impact of school size on test scores. Previous research for Chile suggests 
that there is a positive correlation between school size and test scores (Mizala and Romaguera, 2000). 
Estimates in Gallego et al. (2007), which try to control for endogeneity, also find a positive, but small, 
effect of school enrollment on test scores. These results contrast with some recent causal evidence for the 
US suggesting that enrollment has a negative impact on test scores (Kuziemko, 2006). However, results 
for Chile may be explained because the average (median) public elementary school in Chile operates with 
an enrollment of about 190 (70) students, which is quite small in comparison to enrollment in the US (eg, 
Kuziemko  2006  reports  an  average  school  enrollment  in  her  sample  of  about  418).  The  review  in 
Andrews et al. (2002) suggests that the optimal size –from the point of view of maximizing test scores—
for elementary schools in the US is between 300 and 500 students. Thus, schools in Chile are probably in 
the range in which economies of scale are still very relevant.  14
students should travel at most one hour a day to and from their current school
18 – which, 
based  on  an  average  speed  of  30  kilometers  (kms)  per  hour,  implies  a  maximum 
distance of 15 kms in comparison to their current school
..  
The choice of a speed of 30 kms per hour represents our base case and is consistent with 
results in CIPRES (2006) that reports the average speed in rural public transportation 
ranges from 18 kms per hour in unpaved earth roads, 23 kms per hour in unpaved stone 
chips roads, to 44 kms per hour in paved gravel roads. A weighted average of the speeds 
gives an average of about 27 kms per hour.
19 In order to establish the sensitivity of this 
result, we use two additional estimates considering a speed of 15 kms per hour (and 
therefore, and a distance of 7.5 kms from current school) as a lower bound and 60 kms 
per hour (and therefore, a distance of 30 kms) as an upper bound.
20 
Table  6  presents  the  results  of  the  simulations  for  our  base  and  two  alternative 
scenarios.  We  present  results  for  the  percentage  of  school  and  students  subject  to 
potential consolidation, the percentage of municipalities for which some consolidation 
would be possible, and the average school size after consolidation (as a reference, for 
the sample for which we have information, average initial school enrollment is 55.2 
students). The results suggest that there is a lot of room for the consolidation of schools. 
In our base case (average speed of 30 kms/hr.) about 53% of the students and 75.4% of 
the schools are subject to potential consolidation. The percentage of schools is even 
bigger considering that the consolidated schools tend to be smaller. Even in the most 
conservative scenario (with an average speed of 15 kms/hr.) one-third of the students 
and more than half of the schools could be subject to consolidation.  
Our results also imply that in more than four fifths of the municipalities at least some 
schools could be consolidated. Interestingly, this result does not vary significantly under 
the different scenarios suggesting that in most municipalities there exist schools with 
low enrollment located close to each other. In terms of average school consolidation at 
the municipality level, in our case scenario, the average municipality would consolidate 

18 We do not have GIS information of student homes and, therefore, we have to use current school as a 
proxy for current student location.  
19 Considering that paved gravel roads, unpaved stone chip roads, and unpaved earth roads represent  
24%, 43%, and 36% of  total roads in Chile in 2004-2006, respectively (MOP, 2006).. 
20 As a reference, public transport in Santiago and most urban areas in Chile had an average speed in the 
range from 20 to 30 kilometers per hour in the year 2001 according to the “Encuesta Origen-Destino” of 
that year. (http://www.sectra.cl/contenido/biblioteca/Documentos/EOD2001.zip)  15
42.3% of its students, a big number considering that in this scenario in about 15% of the 
municipalities there is no school consolidation. 
Finally, the different scenarios imply that average enrollment in public schools increases 
in the range between 79.1 and 144.2 students, with a base case of 106.0. Notice that 
these increases imply that average enrollment would not create schools that are much 
smaller  than  the  levels  that  start  to  create p e r v e r s e  e f f e c t s  f o r  s t u d e n t s  ( w h i c h ,  a s  
previously mentioned, are in the range between 300 and 500 students accordingly to 
Andrews et al., 2002). These results also imply that the additional infrastructure needed 
to accommodate more students in each school should not be that significant (this is 
important for the costs of consolidation, as we discuss below).  
Behind  the  average  number  we  just  discussed,  there  is  some  heterogeneity  as  it  is 
evident  in  Figure  7.  This  Figure  presents t h e  d i s t r i b u t i o n  o f  t h e  p r o p o r t i o n  o f  t h e  
enrollment that could be consolidated in the different municipalities. As it is noticeable, 
school  consolidation  could  be a s  b i g  a s  8 6 % ,  b u t  a t  t h e  same  time  about  15%  of 
municipalities would consolidated at most 20% of their students. 
What are the implications of this consolidation in terms of the saving of costs? To 
answer this question, we estimate the average decrease in costs associated to the school 
consolidation and use the estimated effects from Table 5. Column 1 in Table 7 presents 
the average results and Figure 8, on the other hand, presents the expected savings of 
consolidation for the complete distribution of municipalities under our base scenario. 
These estimates imply that consolidation would produce savings that are between 3.5 
and 8.6% of current expenses, with our base scenario having an average decrease in 
costs of 6.2%. It is important to notice that, even in the most conservative scenario, 
these  are  sizeable  savings:  the  median  municipal  deficit  in  education  in  the 
municipalities included in our sample is 1.6%.  
Now, we try to estimate the impacts of some costs of school consolidation that may 
explain why schools operate at a very low scale. First, as the US experience indicates, 
the consolidation of schools is associated with higher transportation costs to the new 
schools (see Gallego et al., 2007 for a detailed revision of the experience in the United 
States  on  this  issue).  To  control  for  this  costs,  we  carried  out  estimations  of  the 
transportation costs that would be required to transport students to their new schools. 
We  considered  the  average  of  the  expenses  in  school  transport  reported  by  the 
households  included  in  the  Social  Protection  Survey  of  the  year  2002  (which 
corresponds to $40 thousand pesos per year per student). Columns (2) and (3) of Table 7  16
present the results. As expected, cost savings decrease, but they still are positive for a 
significant share of the municipalities included in the analysis (reported in Column 3): 
even in the more conservative scenario cost savings are positive for more than 60% of 
the municipalities and for those having savings, the average decrease in costs is 3.2%. 
These results imply that transportation costs are not a binding constraint for most of the 
municipalities included in the analysis 
Second, we control for a more direct measure of total costs of sending students to more 
distant schools. Our previous results just include pecuniary transportation expenditure 
by  households.  Using  results  from  Gallego  and  Hernando  (2009),  who  estimate  the 
utility  equivalent  of  traveling  from  home  to  schools,  which  already  includes 
transportation costs but also includes other non-pecuniary costs,
21 we estimate that total 
transportation costs is 1.65 times pecuniary transportation costs (which corresponds to 
about 66 thousand pesos per year per student). Columns (4) and (5) of Table 7 present 
the results. Results for the extensive margin (column 5) imply that at least about half of 
the municipalities still have positive savings (in the more conservative scenario). For 
those municipalities having positive savings, the decrease in costs is still big ranging 
from 2.7 to 5.5% of the current expenditure level. 
Third,  we  control  for  potential  infrastructure  costs  associated  to  the  fact  that 
consolidated  schools  may  need  to  increase i n f r a s t r u c t u r e  i n  a  s i g n i f i c a n t  w a y .  A s  
presented  in  Table  6,  in  our  base  scenario  the  average  municipality  in  the  sample 
doubles the size –measured through student enrollment—of its schools. This change 
includes both the costs associated to the need to increase the capacity of some schools 
and potential savings associated to renting or selling schools. To evaluate the effect of 
the additional costs on infrastructure we add, as a cost, the annual equivalent of the 
average expenditure for improving school infrastructure in Chile in 2005.
22 As we do 
not have available a good proxy to evaluate the potential value of the schools that now 

21 Such as, for instance, the opportunity cost of time and the insecurity of sending children to schools far 
from home, among others. Putting it differently, it includes all the utility compensation relate to time 
spent traveling to schools that households need to receive.  
22 In particular, we consider the “Aporte de Capital” program, which finances school expansions to meet 
an extended-hours program. The average expenditure of this program is about 60 million pesos by school. 
We  use  a  social  rate  of  discount  of  6%  --the  rate  used  in  Chile  to  evaluate  public  projects,  see 
MIDEPLAN,  2009–to  compute  the  annual  equivalent  of  the  expenditure.  By  construction,  this 
computation is the flow equivalent of doing a net present value calculation.  17
can be placed in alternative uses, results from the previous calculation should be taken 
as a lower-bound in terms of savings.  
Results are reported in Table 7 –columns 6 and 7. Interestingly, both the number of 
municipalities having savings after consolidation and the value of the saving decrease 
but we still observe that more than 40% of municipalities present significant potential 
for savings (with average savings of between 2.5 and 4.3% of the initial expenditure). 
Moreover, the municipalities for which we still identify savings have an average deficit 
of  1.7%  of  their  initial  expenditure  in  education.  Therefore,  the  most  conservative 
calculation derived from our estimators implies that the average deficit would drop to a 
surplus of at least 0.8%. 
In sum, the analysis in this section suggests that still if we control for a number of 
economic costs related to transportation to the new schools and the construction of new 
infrastructure in about half of the municipalities, school consolidation is still efficient 
and, moreover, is equivalent to non-trivial savings for local governments.  
 
5. Why not school consolidation? The role of political factors 
 
We now try to explain the relationship between these results and the institutional setup 
in which rural schools operate. The distributive implications of school consolidation 
play a crucial role on mayors’ choices. To the extent that the losses associated with 
closing schools would be concentrated in small groups, the benefits would be spread 
among  the  complete  population  of  the  municipality.  The  political  economics  of 
narrowly defined special-interest politics tells us that the incentives for the group facing 
the  extra-cost  of  transport  to  influence  the  election  than  the  rest  of  the  population 
(Persson and Tabellini, 2000). 
 
Thus, even if justified in terms of efficiency  gains,  incumbent  majors  might  face  a 
political cost when closing a school. First, the greater the additional cost of transport, 
the greater the incentives this group will have to influence the election. Second, the 
political clout of the group of voters harmed by the decision will be greater in highly 
contestable municipalities, where losing support from even a small constituency could 
imply  losing  the  reelection.  Strategic  mayors  would  not  be  willing  to  capture  the 
efficiency gains from an optimal size allocation if they want to avoid this political cost. 
However, it has to be stressed out that they would only be able to do this if they face  18
soft budgets, i.e., that have access to alternative funds that allow them to cope with the 
inefficiencies. 
 
Our conjecture is, therefore, that closing schools is easier to be done in municipalities 
where  i)  transport  costs  are  lower;  ii)  majors  face  less  competitions;  and  iii) 
municipalities have access to alternative funds. Indeed, the latter two effects should 
interact: in politically contestable municipalities,  where municipalities have access to 
alternative funds, the political concentration effect should be stronger. 
 
In order to test this hypothesis we estimate the following equation: 
k k k k k k k X V HH V HH PC P G J F E D         ' ,         (2) 
where k refers to municipality, PC is the share of rural students that could be reallocated 
accordingly  to  our  simulations,  HH i s  a  H e r f i n d a h l - H i r s c h m a n  i n d e x  o f  p o l i t i c a l  
concentration in local elections (an increase implies a more concentrated electorate), V 
is the share of votes going to the center of left pro-government coalition (and therefore 
having better access to funds from the central government, as shown by Gallego, 2006), 
X i s  a  v e c t o r  o f  c o n t r o l s  ( i n c l u d i n g  t r a n sportation  and  infrastructure  cost  of  the 
reallocation of students), and Pc  is a random shock. 
We use two different dependent variables: (i) the share of the inefficiency –i.e., the 
percentage of students by municipality that could be consolidated in order to reduce 
costs—accordingly to our computations including transportation costs and (ii) the share 
of the inefficiency including both transportation and infrastructure costs. We compute 
electoral  outcomes  using  the  2000  local  elections  to  avoid  potential  endogenous 
causality (recall that our simulation for the reallocation of students was implemented for 
2005).  We compute the Herfindahl-Hirschman  index considering four political groups 
(the opposition center of right coalition, the pro-government center of left coalition, the 
Communist-Green coalition, and all independent groups together). 
Table 8 presents results of estimating equation (2). Results support our hypothesis: the 
effect of political concentration becomes more negative as the proportion of votes going 
to  the  government  coalition  increases,  as  expected.  The  other  variables  present  the 
expected  signs  for  transportation  and  infrastructures  costs  of  student  consolidation, 
which  imply  that  the  higher  the  cost  associated  to  consolidation,  the  lower  the 
consolidation process.  19
Moreover, the results imply that the effect of political competition on the proportion of 
students  subject  to  consolidation  is  not  only  statistically  significant  but  also 
economically relevant. For instance, for a municipality with a pro-government support 
of 52% (close to the average pro-government support in our sample), a one-standard 
deviation increase in the share of support of the government coalition increases the 
absolute value of the effect of political concentration by between 44 and 73% standard 
deviations of the share of students subject to consolidation. 
 
6. Conclusions 
We show that per-student expenditures in municipal schools does not depend on either 
the  total  enrollment  in  public  schools  in  municipalities  or  the  number  of  municipal 
schools in the municipality. In turn, our results suggest the existence of economies of 
scale at the level of the school: close to 75% of the difference observed in the expenses 
per pupil (close to 27% higher in rural areas than urban areas, which is the equivalent to 
about US$560 per year per pupil, or 35% of the yearly per student voucher) is explained 
by differences in average school size. Interestingly, a simulation exercise indicates that 
about  half  of  the  municipal  enrollment  attending  primary  rural  schools  might  be 
concentrated into larger schools, producing significant savings. These results are mostly 
robust to controls for transportation and infrastructure costs and to using alternative 
assumptions on the average speed in rural roads. 
These results imply that currently there are a lot of schools that operate at extremely 
inefficient  operation  levels  even  when  the  schools  belong  to  identical  education 
suppliers.  We  present  evidence  that  at  least  part  of  this  phenomenon  is  related  to 
political economy factors. The closing of schools constitutes significant political costs 
for the mayors, especially when they have potential access to non-voucher funds. Thus, 
municipalities having low political competition levels and access to alternative sources 
of funding (i.e. soft budget constraints) tend to have more efficient school sizes because 
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Figure 1:  Standardized fourth-grade mathematics SIMCE, year 2005, per 




















































































































































Source: Chilean Ministry of Education, SIMCE 2005 4th grade.  
 













































































































































































Source: Chilean Ministry of Education. 
  2
Figure 3: Main reason for enrollment in schools, by school type and area 































Public Schools rural 58.12 3.72
Public Schools urban 38.63 2.00
Voucher Schools rural 33.09 0.80
Voucher Schools urban 21.06 0.50
Proximity No other options

Source: Chilean Ministry of Education, SIMCE 2005. 
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Voucher+Muni Enrollment Municipal Enrollment Voucher Enrollment
 
Source: Chilean Ministry of Education, National Statistics 1992-2006 
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Source: Chilean Ministry of Education, National Statistics 1992-2006 
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Source: Chilean Ministry of Education, National Statistics 1992-2006 
  4















0 .2 .4 .6 .8
(mean) porc_al_cons_com

Source: Authors’ elaboration. 

 
















-.2 -.15 -.1 -.05 0
delta_cost

Source: Authors’ elaboration. 
ECONOMIC HISTORY AND CLIOMETRICS LAB WORKING PAPER SERIES 
 
 
CERDA, RODRIGO: “The Impact of Government Spending on the Duration and the 
Intensity of Economic Crises: Latin America 1900-2000”. Economic History and 
Cliometrics Lab Working Paper #1, 2009. 
 
GALLEGO, FRANCISCO; WOODBERRY, ROBERT: “Christian Missionaries and Education 
in Former African Colonies: How Competition Mattered”. Economic History and 
Cliometrics Lab Working Paper #2, 2009. 
 
MATTA, JUAN JOSÉ: “El Efecto del Voto Obligatorio Sobre las Políticas 
Redistributivas: Teoría y Evidencia para un Corte Transversal de Países”. Economic 
History and Cliometrics Lab Working Paper #3, 2009 
 
COX, LORETO: “Participación de la Mujer en el Trabajo en Chile: 1854-2000”. 
Economic History and Cliometrics Lab Working Paper #4, 2009 
 
GALLEGO, FRANCISCO; WOODBERRY, ROBERt: “Christian Missionaries and Education 
in Former Colonies: How Institutions Mattered”. Economic History and Cliometrics 
Lab Working Paper #5, 2008. 
 
BRUHN, MIRIAM; GALLEGO, FRANCISCO: “Good, Bad and Ugly Colonial Activities: 
Do They Matter for Economic Development”. Economic History and Cliometrics Lab 
Working Paper #6, 2009. 
 
GALLEGO, FRANCISCO: “Historical Origins of Schooling: The Role of Democracy and 
Political Decentralization”. Economic History and Cliometrics Lab Working Paper 
#7, 2009. 
 
GALLEGO, FRANCISCO; RODRÍGUEZ, CARLOS; SAUMA, ENZO: “The Political Economy 
of School Size: Evidence from Chilean Rural Areas”. Economic History and 
Cliometrics Lab Working Paper #8, 2010. 
 
 